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LABOR LAW-NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD MUST DEFER TO
PRIVATE ARBITRATION COMMITrEE'S DECISION TO UPHOLD DISMISSAL
OF EMPLOYEES IF SUCH DECISION PLAUSIBLY WAS BASED ON
COMMITrEE'S FINDING THAT THE EMPLOYEES WERE
"SUPERVISORS" UNPROTECTED BY NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT
NLRB v. Wolff & Munier, Inc. (1984)
The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) is statutorily required
to prevent unfair labor practices.' However, in cases involving disputes
under a collective bargaining agreement, the Board encourages private
resolution and arbitration by deferring to a private arbitrator's deci-
sion.2 This policy has prompted questions as to how wide the scope of
NLRB deference to private arbitration can be without compromising the
Board's statutory mandate. 3 In NLRB v. Wolff & Munier, Inc., 4 three dis-
missed plumbers who had been employed as foremen unsucessfully
challenged their dismissals in arbitration. 5 On appeal to the NLRB, the
Board ordered their reinstatement. The Third Circuit reversed the
NLRB's decision and remanded the case.6 The court instructed the
Board to determine whether the arbitration committee had decided that
the three men were supervisors and therefore not "employees" entitled
to protection under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 7 The
1. For a discussion of the Board's statutory mandate and the applicable text
of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), see infra notes 7 & 16-17 and ac-
companying text.
2. The Board's policy of deferring to an arbitrator's decision has developed
pursuant to a provision in the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) that
encourages voluntary resolution of disputes. See Labor Management Relations
Act § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982). For a further discussion of this policy
provision in the LMRA, see infra note 32 and accompanying text.
3. For a discussion of NLRB deference to private arbitration procedures,
see infra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
4. 747 F.2d 156 (3d Cir. 1984). The panel consisted of District Judge
O'Neill of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania, sitting by designation, and Circuit Judges Adams and Sloviter. Judge
O'Neill wrote for the majority and Judge Sloviter dissented. Id. at 157.
5. Id. at 158.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 160-61. Section 2(3) of the NLRA provides: "The term 'employee'
shall include any employee . . . but shall not include . . . any individual em-
ployed as a supervisor .... "National Labor Relations Act § 2(3), 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(3) (1982).
Section 2(11) of the Act provides:
The term "supervisor" means any individual having authority, in the
interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, pro-
mote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or
responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively
(1040)
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court held that if the committee had addressed that issue, the Board
should defer to its decision, even though the case involved a determina-
tion of the Board's own jurisdiction. 8
Ralph and Robert Campione and Walter Dowd were members of a
plumbers union and were employed as foremen by Wolff & Munier. 9 At
one of the monthly union meetings the three workers each criticized
union officials for allowing the employer to use workers from other un-
ions in jobs reserved for their union.10 Shortly after the union meeting,
a Wolff & Munier superintendent fired one man and warned the other
two that they must stay away from union politics or they would also be
fired." The two men refused to agree to the ultimatum. Later in the
to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the ex-
ercise of such authority is not a merely routine or clerical nature, but
requires the use of independent judgment.
Id. § 152(11) (1982).
8. 747 F.2d at 161. For a discussion of NLRB deference to arbitration, see
infra notes 20-25 and accompanying text. Judge Sloviter's dissent noted that it
was most unusual to require the NLRB to defer to an independent body's deter-
mination of the Board's own jurisdiction. 747 F.2d at 168 (Sloviter, J., dissent-
ing). For a discussion of Judge Sloviter's dissent, see infra notes 26-31 and
accompanying text.
9. 747 F.2d at 158. Wolff & Munier, Inc., operated the Passaic Valley Sew-
age Treatment Plant at Newark, New Jersey. Id. The company employed ap-
proximately 30 plumbers at the jobsite. Id. Ralph Campione was hired in
March, 1978, as a journeyman plumber and was promoted to foreman that sum-
mer. Id. Walter Dowd was hired in the late summer of 1979 and was promoted
to foreman in June of 1980. Id. Robert Campione was hired as a foreman in
May of 1979. Id. Each man was a member of Local Union #24 of the United
Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the Pipefitting Industry of the
United States and Canada, AFL-CIO, with which Wolff & Munier had a collec-
tive bargaining agreement. Id.
10. Id. On August 28, 1980, Local #24 held its monthly meeting. Id. The
three men criticized Local #24's business agent for allowing Wolff & Munier to
place nonplumbers in jobs classified as belonging to union plumbers. Id. The
business agent allegedly threatened to retaliate against the men. Id.
11. Id. The Wolff & Munier superintendent fired Ralph Campione immedi-
ately, explaining that Campione had repeatedly been warned to stay away from
union politics. Id. Later in the day, the superintendent warned Robert Camp-
ione and Walter Dowd that they, too, would be fired if they continued to be
involved in union politics. Id. Shortly thereafter, both Robert Campione and
Walter Dowd were fired. Id. Wolff & Munier explained that it dismissed the
foremen in order to cut costs. Wolff & Munier, 262 N.L.R.B. 333, 337 (1982).
The evidence showed that the company's payroll included three foremen above
the number required under its collective bargaining agreement with Local #24.
Id.
The superintendent contended that on the day the men were fired he ini-
tially offered Ralph Campione a position as a journeyman plumber. Id. at 335.
However, Campione became abusive and accused the superintendent of con-
spiring with Local #24 to reduce his involvement in workplace politics. Id.
Only then did the superintendent fire Campione. Id. The superintendent testi-
fied that the warning he delivered to Robert Campione and Walter Dowd con-
cerned their habit of engaging in union activities on company time. Id.
According to the superintendent, the two men refused to comply with his re-
quest. Id.
2
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day the superintendent notified them that they too had been fired.
1 2
Pursuant to the union and Wolff & Munier's contractual arbitration
procedure, which established an arbitration committee to adjudicate
such disputes, the three discharged men submitted a grievance alleging
unjust dismissal.' 3 The committee found no merit in the charge. The
committee also found that the employer's right to terminate an em-
ployee with foreman status was unrestricted under the bargaining
agreement. 14
The three employees subsequently filed an unfair labor practice
charge with the NLRB, which declined to defer to the decision of the
arbitration committee.1 5 The Board found that the three employees
were not supervisors as that term is defined by the NLRA and that there-
fore the employees were within the Act's jurisdiction and entitled to its
protection. 16 The Board then held that Wolff & Munier had violated
12. 747 F.2d at 158.
13. Id. The three men filed a charge with Local #24's grievance commit-
tee. 262 N.L.R.B. at 336. The committee, known as the "E Board," determined
that the issue should be taken to the next step in the grievance procedure, the
"Joint Conference Committee." Id. The Joint Conference Committee was an
arbitration device required under the collective bargaining agreement for the
settlement of disputes arising between parties to the agreement. 747 F.2d at
158. It was composed of five union officers and five management representa-
tives. Id. The collective bargaining agreement stated that the committee's deci-
sions were to be binding on the parties and their respective members. Id.
14. 747 F.2d at 158. The written record of the committee's decision totaled
one page. Id. at 159. In pertinent part, it provided:
[T]here was no substantiation of the charge by the Campiones and
Dowd that they were unjustly dismissed. The committee decided that
there should be no restriction on an employer terminating a foreman in
that it had been the employer's sole decision to employ the person in
question as a foreman. In other words, if he had the right to appoint
him he had the right to terminate him. The committee further believes
that under the Local 24-MCA current collective bargaining agreement
there is no restriction on the right to terminate any employee whether
foreman or not under conditions similar to those occurring in this case.
Id.
15. Id. For a discussion of NLRB deference to arbitration, see infra notes
20-25 and accompanying text.
16. 747 F.2d at 158-59. For the statutory definition of supervisor, see supra
note 7. Professor Gorman identifies several factors which the NLRB judges as
important in determining whether an employee is a supervisor within the statu-
tory meaning. See generally, R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAw 36 (1976).
The Board will usually find that an employee with authority to make judgmental
personnel decisions is a supervisor, even if the authority is rarely used. Id. See,
e.g., Phalo Plastics Corp., 127 N.L.R.B. 1511, 1513 (1960) (Board will look be-
yond appearances to determine how perfunctory authority is, as well as how reg-
ularly it is exercised); American Cable & Radio Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 258, 259-60
(1958) (employees held to be supervisors even though 40-70% of their time was
spent at rank and file tasks because they had authority, albeit rarely exercised, to
discharge other employees); Yamada Transfer, 115 N.L.R.B. 1330, 1332-33
(1956) (authority to fire, even if rarely used, is most important factor in deter-
mining supervisory status).
If an employee is found to be a supervisor, his union-related activities are
3
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sections 8(a)(1) and (3) of the NLRA by terminating the three men be-
cause of their participation in union affairs. 17
The Third Circuit overturned the Board's decision and remanded
the case,' 8 instructing the Board to determine whether the arbitration
committee had decided that the three men were supervisors.' 9 The
court ruled that if the committee had decided the issue, the Board's re-
fusal to defer to that decision would be an abuse of discretion. 20
not protected by the NLRA. See NLRB v. Inter-City Advertising Co., 190 F.2d
420 (4th Cir. 1951) (employer is free to discharge supervisors in retaliation for
union activities), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 908 (1952). See also NLRB v. Southern
Plasma Corp., 626 F.2d 1287 (5th Cir. 1980) (noting that purpose of exemption
is to assure management of undivided loyalty of its supervisory personnel).
Ralph Campione's functions included assigning and overseeing the work of
the journeymen plumbers. 262 N.L.R.B. at 334. The collective bargaining
agreement specifically stated that foremen "shall supervise" the journeymen.
Id. at 337. Yet, it should be noted that having a nominally supervisory role does
not always place a worker within the NLRA supervisory exemption. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Berger Transfer & Storage Co., 678 F.2d 679, 688 (7th Cir. 1982)
(foremen are not automatically supervisors).
17. 747 F.2d at 159. The NLRA provides:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise
of the rights guaranteed in section 7 ....
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment
or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discour-
age membership in any labor organization . ...
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3) (1982).
The rights protected by § 7 are "the right to self-organization, to form, join
or assist labor organizations." Id. § 157. Employees may file charges of unfair
labor practices with the NLRB. See R. GORMAN, supra note 16, at 7-8.
The most typical employer violation of the Act is discharging an employee
because of his membership in or support for a union. Id. at 137. See NLRB v.
Fibers Int'l Corp., 439 F.2d 1311, 1315 (1st Cir. 1971) (violation if, but for anti-
union feeling, employer would not have taken punitive action). See also NLRB v.
Whitfield Pickle Co., 374 F.2d 576, 582 (5th Cir. 1967) (employer's punitive
action unlawful as long as improper motive contributed to action, even if that
motive was only small factor).
The NLRB ruled that Wolff & Munier's actions were precisely the type of
§ 8(a)(3) violation Professor Gorman had described. 262 N.L.R.B. at 339.
18. 747 F.2d at 158.
19. Id. at 160. The NLRB argued that it need not defer to the decision of
the arbitration committee because there was no evidence that the committee
considered whether the three men were protected as "employees" under the
Act. Id. The Third Circuit, on the other hand, reasoned that the arbitrators
might indeed have considered the issue and might have determined that the
three men were "supervisors" who were not entitled to file § 8 unfair labor prac-
tice charges. Id. If it had considered the issue and made such a determination,
the committee would have been justified in ending its inquiry when it did. Id.
20. Id. The Third Circuit adopted the Board's own four criteria for when
deference to an arbitrator is appropriate in NLRB v. Pincus Bros., Inc.-Max-
well, 620 F.2d 367, 371 (3d Cir. 1980) (citing Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B.
1080 (1955)). See Speilberg, 112 N.L.R.B. at 1082 (Board established three-part
standard for when it will defer to arbitration award). After Spielberg, the Board
added the further requirement that the arbitrator must have considered the un-
4
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The court noted that the arbitration committee had decided the em-
ployer had a contractual right to fire the three foremen at will. 2 ' How-
ever, the court was unable to determine whether the committee's ruling
was based on an implicit finding that the men were supervisors as de-
fined by the NLRA. 22 Under the standard enunciated in an earlier Third
fair labor practice issue and ruled on it. Raytheon Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 883, 884-
86 (1963). The four criteria are:
(1) The issue under the Act was presented and considered in arbitration.
Pincus, 620 F.2d at 371. Currently, the Board will find that an arbitrator has
adequately considered the unfair labor practice if the contractual issue is factu-
ally parallel to the unfair practice issue and the arbitrator was presented gener-
ally with facts relevant to resolving the issue. See Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573
(1984). However, some reviewing courts apply stricter standards. See generally
Banyard v. NLRB, 505 F.2d 342 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The Banyard court added two
further requirements: that the arbitrator clearly decided the issue and that the
issue was within the arbitrator's competence. Id. at 347. For a discussion of
arbitral competence, see infra note 36. Other courts have approved these addi-
tional requirements. See Stephenson v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 535, 538 (9th Cir.
1977).
(2) The arbitral proceedings must have been fair and regular. Pincus, 620
F.2d at 371. The proceedings must meet minimum due process standards. See,
e.g., Precision Fittings, Inc., 141 N.L.R.B. 1034, 1041 (1963) (evidence deliber-
ately withheld from arbitrator); Gateway Transp. Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1763, 1763-
64 (1962) (insufficient time to prepare); Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 123 N.L.R.B.
395, 408 (1959) (no opportunity to confront witness). The Board has also de-
clined to defer if the arbitrator is hostile to the grievant. See Roadway Express
Inc., 145 N.L.R.B. 513, 515 (1963). Similarly, the Board will not defer where
the grievant's representative is hostile to the grievant. See International Long-
shoremen & Warehousemen Local 27, 205 N.L.R.B. 1141, 1147 (1973).
(3) All parties to the suit must have agreed to be bound by the arbitrator's
decision. Pincus, 620 F.2d at 371. This requirement is the least controversial
and most easily met since the parties themselves select the arbitration process
and agree to be bound by it. Id. at 374.
(4) The arbitrator's decision cannot be repugnant to the policies of the Act.
Id. at 371. In Olin, the Board held that it would find this standard not met only if
the award is "palpably wrong" or not susceptible to an interpretation consistent
with the NLRA. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 574 (1984).
The Board further requires that the party seeking to have the Board reject
deferral show that the above standards are not met. Id. In Pincus, the Third
Circuit held that if an arbitrator's decision is susceptible to two meanings, one
permissible under the Act and one impermissible, the Board must assume the
arbitrator intended the permissible meaning. 620 F.2d at 373. In such a case,
the Board would be unable to find the arbitrator's decision repugnant to the
purposes of the Act. Id.
21. 747 F.2d at 160. For the relevant portion of the committee's decision,
see supra note 14.
22. 747 F.2d at 160. For a discussion of the statutory distinction between
employees and supervisors, see supra note 7. One of the problems for the Third
Circuit in Wolff & Munier was that the arbitrator's decision was vague as to
whether it had considered this statutory distinction. 747 F.2d at 168 (Sloviter,
J., dissenting). The arbitration committee first distinguished the employer's
right to fire foremen ("no restriction on ... terminating a foreman"), but then
pointed out that a similar right existed in respect to other employees ("there is
no restriction on the right to terminate any employee whether foreman or not").
See id. at 162 (Sloviter, J., dissenting) (citing language of arbitration committee's
1044 [Vol. 30: p. 1040
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Circuit decision, if an arbitrator's decision is susceptible to two mean-
ings, one permissible, the other impermissible, the Board must choose
the permissible meaning.23 Therefore, the Board was ordered to deter-
mine, on remand, if the committee's decision plausibly could have been
based on the employees' status as supervisors as defined by the NLRA.
24
The court ruled that if the Board were to find such a plausible basis it
decision). As Judge Sloviter noted, the decision's vagueness and brevity made it
very difficult to determine if the contractual issue was parallel to the statutory
issue and whether the arbitrator was presented with facts generally relevant to
the statutory problem. Id. at 168 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
The Third Circuit approves of Board deferral as long as it is arguable that
the arbitrator decided the statutory issue or if the statutory and contractual is-
sues are closely related. Hammermill Paper Co. v. NLRB, 658 F.2d 155, 160 (3d
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1080 (1983). The court in Hammermill stated that
the Board could defer as long as the arbitrator had "at least arguably consid-
ered" the statutory issue. Id. The court ruled that deference could be proper
even where the statutory issue was not specifically raised before the arbitrator as
long as the issues were factually similar. See id. (failure to raise statutory issue
not sine qua non for refusal to defer).
In Pincus, the court held that arbitration decisions are not clearly repugnant
to the NLRA if they are susceptible to two interpretations, one permissible and
one impermissible. 620 F.2d at 374. In Hammermill, the court seemingly
adopted this test as the standard to determine whether an arbitrator has re-
solved the statutory issue. See Hammermill, 658 F.2d at 160. During a discussion
of presentment of the statutory issue, the Hammermill court cited Pincus for this
proposition. Id. (quoting Pincus, 620 F.2d at 374).
Prior to Hammermill, the Third Circuit required that the arbitrator must have
clearly decided the statutory issue in order for Board deference to be proper.
See NLRB v. General Warehouse Corp., 643 F.2d 965, 969 (3d Cir. 1981). In
General Warehouse, the court held that the arbitrator's decision must indisputably
resolve the unfair labor practice issue. Id. at 969 n.16 (quoting Stephenson v.
NLRB, 550 F.2d 535, 538 n.4 (9th Cir. 1977)).
More recent Third Circuit decisions appear to have adopted the Hammermill
standard. See, e.g., United Parcel Serv. v. NLRB, 706 F.2d 972, 981 (3d Cir.
1983) (deference inappropriate only because no evidence of protected activity
presented to arbitrator; Board must be presented with some evidence of such
resolution) vacated on other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 419 (1983).
For a discussion of the standards applied by other courts and the NLRB, see
supra note 20.
23. See Pincus, 620 F.2d at 374. The court in Pincus ruled that the NLRB
must defer as long as "the findings of the arbitrator may arguably be character-
ized as not inconsistent with Board policy." Id. If the arbitrator's reasoning is
susceptible to two interpretations, one permissible and one impermissible, the
Board must accept the permissible meaning and defer. Id. Therefore, an arbi-
tration award which is only "arguably correct" must be sustained. Id. The
Board must defer even though it might have reached a different conclusion in a
trial de novo. Id.
24. 747 F.2d at 161. The court stated: "What is not clear is why the Board
chose not to defer to a finding that the employees were foremen and thus could
be discharged at will." Id. Under current NLRB standards, the party urging
rejection of deferral bears the burden of proof. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573,
574 (1984). Therefore, the three employees can prevail only if they are able to
show that the arbitrator was not presented with facts generally relevant to
resolving the supervisor issue. See id. For further discussion of the Olin stan-
dard, see supra note 20.
6
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would have to defer unless it determined that the committee's decision
was clearly repugnant to the purposes of the NLRA.
25
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Sloviter disagreed with the majority's
characterization of when Board deferral to arbitration is appropriate. 26
The dissent distinguished two situations in which the issue of deference
might arise. In the first, the dispute is solely concerned with an issue
arising under the collective bargaining agreement and is clearly a matter
for Board deference. 2 7 In the second, the conduct in question both vio-
lates the agreement and constitutes an unfair labor practice. 28 Judge
Sloviter stated that the Board may exercise its discretion and defer to
arbitration in the second situation but that such deference is a matter of
choice and is not required by law. 29 The dissent also commented that a
question concerning NLRB jurisdiction was particularly inappropriate
for deferral to an arbitrator.3 0 Judge Sloviter felt that even if the arbi-
25. 747 F.2d at 161. Under the Olin standards, an arbitrator's decision does
not have to be totally consistent with Board policy. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B.
573, 574 (1984). The Board will not overturn the decision unless it is "palpably
wrong." Id.
26. 747 F.2d at 167-68 (Sloviter,J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 167 (Sloviter,J., dissenting). For a discussion of Board deference
to arbitration in these situations, see infra notes 20-25.
28. 747 F.2d at 168 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 167 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). Judge Sloviter also argued that
under § 10(f) of the NLRA, Board decisions supported by substantial evidence
may not be overturned by a reviewing court. Id. Judge Sloviter found that there
was substantial evidence that the arbitration committee had never addressed the
"supervisor" issue. Id. Therefore, in her view, the court abused its authority by
reversing the Board. Id.
The substantial evidence rule does not apply to questions of law. See Pincus,
620 F.2d at 372. However, in Pincus, the Third Circuit held that Board deferral
to arbitration was a matter of discretion and therefore not mandated by law. Id.
The Pincus court held that the substantial evidence standard applied to the ques-
tion of whether that discretion was abused. Id.
Judge Sloviter also claimed that Wolff& Munier did not raise the supervisor
issue before the Board. 747 F.2d at 163 (Sloviter,J., dissenting). Judge Sloviter
argued that this issue was only mentioned before the Board by the administra-
tive law judge when he rejected testimony on the point and noted that it had not
been raised as an issue. Id. Section 10(e) of the NLRA provides: "No objection
that has not been urged before the Board . . . shall be considered by the court.
.29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1982). As application of § 10(e) is mandatory, when
an issue is not raised before the Board, the court of appeals may not consider
such an issue. See Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, 456 U.S. 645, 665-
66 (1982) (court is powerless to consider questions not raised before Board).
Therefore, Judge Sloviter reasoned, the court should not have even considered
the supervisor issue. 747 F.2d at 165-66 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
30. 747 F.2d at 168 (Sloviter,J., dissenting). Judge Sloviter argued that the
question of whether or not the three men were supervisors was a "threshold
issue . . . central to the Board's general enforcement of the Act." Id. The dis-
sent pointed out that NLRB deference to arbitration, in cases of alleged statu-
tory violations, is a matter of choice, limited only by the standards the Board has
adopted for itself. Id. Judge Sloviter stated that she would find it surprising
"were the Board to choose to defer to an arbitral determination of its own juris-
diction." Id.
7
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tration committee had considered and resolved whether the three men
were supervisors, the Board was not bound by that decision. 3 1
NLRB deferral to contractual arbitration procedures is a problem-
atic area because the labor relations statutes contain two conflicting pol-
icies on the subject. Section 203(d) of the Labor Management Relations
Act (LMRA) declares that an agreed method to resolve problems arising
under a collective bargaining agreement is "the desirable method for
settlement of . . .disputes."'3 2 However, section 10(a) of the NLRA
empowers the Board to prevent unfair labor practices and states that
this power is unaffected by any other means of adjustment or
prevention. 33
The Supreme Court has ruled that courts must defer to an arbitra-
tor's decision if the alleged grievance arises under a collective bargain-
ing agreement.34 The Court, in United Steel Workers v. Warrior & Gulf
The Board has chosen to afford broad deference to arbitration, even when
the matter is purely one of law. See Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 574 (1984).
This approach has met with criticism, from inside and outside the Board. See,
e.g., Collyer Insulated Wire, Gulf& Western Sys., 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 846 (1971)
(Fanning, M., dissenting) (Board must not abdicate its statutory responsibilities
through deference or parties will be stripped of their statutory rights); Panel Dis-
cussion of the Labor Relations Law Section of the ABA, 83 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 355
(1973) (decision may be placed in hands of persons who are not legally trained).
The Board has chosen some areas as inappropriate for deference. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth Gas Co., 218 N.L.R.B. 857, 858 (1975) (Board will not defer to
arbitration award concerning representation issues); Servair, Inc., 236 N.L.R.B.
1278, 1280 (1978) (Board cannot defer in cases alleging unlawful employer
assistance to union); Filmaton Assocs., 227 N.L.R.B. 1721 (1977) (prchibition
against discharging employee for filing charges under NLRA is fundamental
guarantee to employees and deference will not be applied in such cases in order
to protect Board processes from abuse). For a discussion of other restrictions
on the Board's power to defer, see infra note 63.
31. 747 F.2d at 167-68 (Sloviter, J., dissenting).
32. Labor Management Relations Act § 203(d), 29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982).
The Act provides in pertinent part: "Final adjustment by a method agreed upon
by the parties is hereby declared to be the desirable method for settlement of
grievance disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existing
collective-bargaining agreement." Id.
33. National Labor Relations Act § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1982). The
Act reads in pertinent part:
The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any per-
son from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed in section 8 [29
U.S.C. § 158]) affecting commerce. This power shall not be affected by
any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be
established by agreement, law, or otherwise. ...
Id.
34. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960). In the now famous Steelworkers trilogy, the Supreme Court decided that
courts may enforce a grievance arbitration procedure created pursuant to a col-
lective bargaining agreement. Id. at 585. See also United Steelworkers v. Enter-
prise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American
Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960). The Court in Warrior & Gulf held that if a partic-
ular grievance is plausibly covered by the agreement's arbitration clause, courts
should require arbitration. 363 U.S. at 582-83. The Court in Enterprise Wheel
8
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Navigation Co., s 5 reasoned that industrial peace would be advanced
through voluntary resolution of problems aided by arbitrators with spe-
cial expertise in the "common law of the shop."' 36 Yet many grievances
also held that courts may not question the arbitrator's interpretaion of the
agreement. 363 U.S. at 597. The Court stated that under the agreement, "[i]t is
the arbitrator's construction which was bargained for; and so far as the arbitra-
tor's decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no business
overruling him because their interpretation of the contract is different from his."
Id. at 599. The Court reasoned that to allow plenary review on the merits would
make meaningless the contractual intent that the arbitrator's decision should be
final. Id. The Court in American Mfg. also endorsed a broad reading of the typi-
cal arbitration clause. 363 U.S. at 567-68. According to the Court, disputes
concerning the meaning, interpretation and application of the collective bar-
gaining agreement include all claims which are facially covered by the contract.
Id. at 568. See Cox, Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration, 30 RoCKY
MTN. L. REV. 247 (1958).
Professor Cox wrote that:
[t]he typical arbitration clause is written in words which cover, without
limitation, all disputes concerning the interpretation or application of a
collective bargaining agreement. Its words do not restrict its scope to
meritorious disputes or two-sided disputes. . . . What one man con-
siders frivolous another may find meritorious, and it is common knowl-
edge in industrial relations circles that grievance arbitration often
serves as a safety valve for troublesome complaints. Under these cir-
cumstances it seems proper to read the typical arbitration clause as a
promise to arbitrate every claim, meritorious or frivolous, which the
complaint bases upon the contract.
Id. at 261.
35. 363 U.S. 574 (1980).
36. Id. at 581. The Warrior & Gulf Court characterized the functions of the
labor arbitrator as foreign to the competence of courts. Id. The Court felt that
the arbitrator's source of law includes the express terms of the contracts and the
industrial common law-"the practices of the industry and the shop." Id. at
581-82. The arbitrator is chosen because the parties have confidence that he
possesses this knowledge and because they trust his personal knowledge. Id. at
582. They expect that his judgment will be based not only on the contract but
on the productivity of the shop, its morale, and whether tensions will increase as
a result of the decision. Id.
The Court stated that the grievance procedure is a part of the continuous
collective bargaining process. Id. The Court viewed the collective bargaining
agreement as an effort to create a system of industrial self-government, and an
attempt to regulate the employer-employee relationship through a rule of law
rather than through constant contention and struggle. Id. at 580. The Court
stated that the
grievance machinery . . . is at the very heart of the system of industrial
self-government. Arbitration is the means of solving the unforeseeable
by molding a system of private law for all the problems which may
arise. . . .The processing of disputes through the grievance machin-
ery is actually a vehicle by which meaning and content are given to the
collective bargaining agreement.
Id. at 581.
The Court described the agreement as more than a contract. Id. at 578.
"[I]t is a generalized code .... It calls into being a new common law. . . of a
particular industry or . . .plant." Id. at 578-79.
But see Hays, The Future of Labor Arbitration, 74 YALE L.J. 1019 (1965). Judge
Hays argued that the special expertise of the industrial arbitrator is a myth and
1048
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arising under collective bargaining agreements also involve potential
unfair labor practices. 3 7 The Court has held that the NLRB's power in
such cases is superior to that of the arbitrator. 3 8 However, in a case
that in reality, the arbitrator will know nothing of the background of the dispute
or of the "common law" of the industry. Id. at 1034. Judge Hays stated that
only a few arbitrators actually possessed the necessary training and skill to make
them good judges. Id. He felt that thousands of decisions were handed down
every year by arbitrators who were wholly unfit for theirjobs. Id. at 1035. Judge
Hays also felt that a large proportion of awards were based not on contractual
interpretation but on appeasement of the involved parties, a result stemming
from the arbitrator's desire to be invited back to hear other cases. Id.
Studies of the arbitration process have indicated that the evaluation of the
Supreme Court may be more accurate than that ofJudge Hays. See Rothschild,
Arbitration and the National Labor Relations Board, 28 OHIo ST. L.J. 195, 259 (1967)
(Supreme Court's characterization of arbitration is closer to that of satisfied par-
ticipants). See also Finley, Labor Arbitration: The Quest for Industrial Justice, 18 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 1091, 1100 (1967) (Finley, a union attorney, concludes that
arbitrators are better qualified than judges).
37. See Atleson, Disciplinary Discharges, Arbitration and NLRB Deference, 20
BUFFALO L. REV. 355 (1971). The same conduct may give rise to both unfair
labor practice charges and to an arbitrable grievance. Id. at 358. For example, a
shop steward dismissed because of his union activities may have a contractual
claim that he was dismissed without just cause, as well as a claim under § 8(a)(3)
of the NLRA. Id. at 368.
After the Supreme Court's Steelworkers decisions, many observers and some
courts felt that the NLRB had no power in disputes subject to a contractual arbi-
tration procedure, even if there was an alleged unfair labor practice. See, e.g.,
Square D Co. v. NLRB, 332 F.2d 360, 365-66 (9th Cir. 1964) (court refused to
enforce Board order, concluding that NLRA does not control matters subject to
contractual grievance procedure; Board "had no power to determine that the
Company committed unfair labor practices"); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v.
NLRB, 325 F.2d 746, 754 (6th Cir. 1963) (now established law that where dis-
pute is subject to grievance procedure and arbitration that procedure is exclu-
sive), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 971 (1964).
The Board expressed its own opinion on the subject in International Har-
vester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962):
There is no question that the Board is not precluded from adjudicating
unfair labor practice charges even though they might have been the
subject of an arbitration proceeding and award. . . . However, it is
• . . established that the Board has considerable discretion to respect
an arbitration award and decline to exercise its authority over alleged
unfair labor practices if to do so will serve the fundamental aims of the
Act.
The Act, as has repeatedly been stated, is primarily designed to
promote industrial peace and stability by encouraging the practice and
procedure of collective bargaining. Experience has demonstrated that
• . . arbitration of grievance[s] . . . contribute[s] significantly to the at-
tainment of this statutory objective.
Id. at 925-26.
The Board concluded that in cases where it would "effectuate the policies of
the Act to respect the [arbitration] award," the Board would voluntarily defer.
Id. at 929. However, the Board specifically noted that "an arbitrator's award
• . . cannot oust the Board of its jurisdiction to adjudicate unfair labor practice
charges ...... Id.
38. See NLRB v. Strong Roofing & Insulating Co., 393 U.S. 357, 360 (1969).
In Strong Roofing, the Court made clear that the Board's authority to remedy un-
10
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involving a potential unfair labor practice in the context of a question of
workplace jurisdiction, the Court held that the Board may exercise its
discretion and defer to the arbitrator's decision as a matter of choice.
3 9
The NLRB and reviewing courts have not interpreted this ruling as lim-
iting Board deference to cases involving workplace jurisdiction or simi-
lar questions. 40 Board deference has been permitted as long as the
fair labor practices is not affected by the existence of a grievance procedure
under the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 360-61.
The Court later rejected the idea that the Board might lack jurisdiction over
alleged unfair labor practices because the dispute also involved interpretation of
the collective bargaining agreement. See NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385
U.S. 421, 428 (1967). The Court noted that Congress gave the Board supreme
power to remedy unfair labor practices. Id. at 428. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(a)
(1982) (NLRB is empowered to prevent any unfair labor practice).
The contention that the Board lacks jurisdiction over unfair labor practices
involving contract interpretation subject to arbitration is not without support in
the Act's legislative history. See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21, 23
(1947).
In 1947, Congress refused to adopt an amendment to the NLRA which
would have given the Board unfair labor practice jurisdiction over all breaches
of collective bargaining agreements. Id. at 23. Congress adopted the current
§ 203(d) of the LMRA instead, declaring that voluntary arbitration is the desired
method for settlement of contractual disputes. For the applicable portion of the
LMRA, see supra note 32.
The Supreme Court has expressed its opinion that Congress failed to pass
the amendment because it did not want the Board to have a generalized power
to regulate the terms of private collective bargaining agreements. NLRB v. C &
C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421, 427 (1967).
39. See Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 271-72 (1964). A
dispute over workplace jurisdiction concerns which union should represent em-
ployees doing particular work. Id. at 263. The union in Carey, the International
Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers (IUE), asserted that employees
in the salaried, technical employee bargaining group were actually production
and maintenance employees. Id. The Board deferred to an arbitrator's judg-
ment on the matter and the employer objected. Id. The Court stated that the
Board may defer to arbitration even though the matter in question may consti-
tute an unfair labor practice. Id. at 271. The Court acknowledged that arbitra-
tion advances industrial peace. Id. However, the Court noted that should the
Board disagree with the arbitrator, the Board's ruling takes precedence. Id. at
272. Justice Douglas, writing for the majority in Carey, expressed his belief that
Board deference to arbitration was an appropriate policy because it advanced
industrial peace with no loss of statutory protection as the Board could invoke
its superior authority at any time. Id.
40. See Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 577-81 (1984) (Zimmerman, M., dis-
senting) (discussion of scope of board deference). See also NLRB v. Pincus Bros.,
Inc.-Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367, 383 (3d Cir. 1980) (Garth, J., concurring). In Pin-
cus, Judge Garth stated that "Carey's approval of the deferral doctrine ... was in
no way limited to [workplace jurisdiction] cases alone." Id. Judge Garth pointed
out that the Carey Court quoted with approval two Board cases involving defer-
ence to arbitral resolution of § 8(a)(3) claims. Id. at 383 n.6 (Garth, J., concur-
ring) (citing Carey, 375 U.S. at 270-72).
In Pincus, Judge Gibbons argued that Board deferral to arbitration is a pol-
icy set by the Board. 620 F.2d at 384-88 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). As such, he
noted, it is within the Board's power to reverse the policy and entertain all
claims on a de novo basis. Judge Gibbons reasoned that since deferral was a
1050 [Vol. 30: p. 1040
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controversy has arisen under the collective bargaining agreement. 4 1
The Board itself has established criteria for when it will defer to an
arbitrator's award but reviewing courts have often been suspicious of
the Board's application of its standards.4 2 Courts have attempted to in-
sure that the Board does not become overly deferential and thereby ab-
dicate its statutory mandate to remedy unfair labor practices. 43 In
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. ,44 the Supreme Court expressed its con-
voluntary Board policy, a court of appeals should never reverse a Board decision
declining to defer. Id.
Judge Garth agreed that deferral was a voluntary Board policy. Id. at 384
(GarthJ., concurring). However, he stated that the standards of administrative
law require the Board to follow its own announced policies until those policies
are abandoned or modified. Id.
41. For a discussion of NLRB deference to private arbitration, see supra
notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
42. See Spielberg, 112 N.L.R.B. at 1082. See also Banyard v. NLRB, 505 F.2d
342 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The Banyard court announced two additional require-
ments which must be met before Board deferral is appropriate: The arbitrator
must clearly decide the unfair labor practice issue and the issue must be within
the arbitrator's competence. Id. See also Stephenson v. NLRB, 550 F.2d 535 (9th
Cir. 1977). In Stephenson, the Ninth Circuit adopted the Banyard criteria, stating:
Where the question of unfair labor practice depends on contract inter-
pretation, the expertise of arbitrators (or at least its recognition by the
parties to the collective bargaining agreement) is held to be superior to
that of the Board which primarily considers the statutory issues. Thus,
deference in situations where the statutory and contractual issues are
congruent is entirely reasonable. Likewise, where resolution of the un-
fair labor practice charge involves mainly factual rather than statutory
issues, the arbitrator is in as good a position to make a correct decision
as is the Board, given the former's access to the facts and to the current
practices of the industry. . . . However, where the decision to be
made rests primarily on issues of public law rather than on contractual
or factual determinations, the arbitrator possesses no special expertise
and there is no reason for allowing his decision to determine the statu-
tory rights of the parties. . . . Therefore, the "competence" require-
ment requires the Board to ascertain the underlying issues in the unfair
labor practice charges and to determine whether arbitral expertise and
institutional competence justify deferral to arbitration of a particular
statutory dispute.
Id. at 538 n.4 (citations omitted).
43. See, e.g., Banyard, 505 F.2d at 348. The Banyard court noted: "If... the
• . . Committee applied to the issue before it a standard correct under the con-
tract but not under judicial interpretation . . . then it cannot be said that the
statutory issue was decided. . . . In that event the Board's abstention goes be-
yond deferral and approaches abdication." Id.
The Seventh Circuit has upheld the Board's refusal to defer to an award
that would have permitted violation of the employee's § 7 rights. See Dreis &
Krump Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 544 F.2d 320, 330 (7th Cir. 1976). See also NLRB v.
Magnetics Int'l, Inc., 699 F.2d 806 (6th Cir. 1983) (Board must resolve any
doubts about deferral against party urging deference in order to protect statu-
tory mandate from abdication).
44. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 bars dis-
crimination in employment on the basis of race and provides that aggrieved indi-
viduals may resort to lawsuits once the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission has attempted conciliation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (1982). In Gard-
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cern with an analogous problem, and held that a reviewing court may
not defer to the outcome of a contractual arbitration procedure when
there is an alleged violation of a nonwaivable, statutory right. 45 The
Court ruled that the statutory protections of title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 constituted such nonwaivable rights.4 6
The Third Circuit has been one of the courts most hospitable to
Board deferral. 4 7 In NLRB v. Pincus Bros. Inc.-Maxwell,4 8 the court in-
ner-Denver, the Supreme Court was faced with a case where the collective bar-
gaining agreement barred discrimination on the basis of race and provided for
arbitration of grievances. 415 U.S. at 39. An employee who was discharged for
poor work challenged the discharge through the grievance procedure. Id. at 38-
39. The issue of racial discrimination was presented to the arbitrator but he
ruled that the dismissal was for just cause. Id. at 42. The question presented to
the Court was whether a reviewing court should defer to the arbitrator's deci-
sion or consider the employee's claim de novo. Id. at 43.
45. 415 U.S. at 54. The Court distinguished between rights "conferred on
employees collectively to foster the processes of bargaining," which may be
waived by the union in order to gain economic benefits, and non-majoritarian
rights, which cannot be waived. Id. at 51. The Court held that rights that cannot
be waived by the bargaining agent are entitled to de novo review by the body
charged with public protection of those rights. Id. at 50. Noting that deference
to the findings of an arbitator precludes a full hearing on the merits, the Court
held that anything less than a full hearing on the merits amounted to an abridge-
ment of litigants' statutory rights. Id. at 59. The Court noted the similarity be-
tween title VII and the NLRA in that both statutes may implicate both
contractual and statutory rights; however, the Court failed to explain the signifi-
cance, if any, of this comparison. Id. at 50. The Court explained that the em-
ployee's rights under the Civil Rights Act and under the labor contract were of a
completely different nature. Id. at 49-50. It also noted that the arbitrator's task
was to determine and effectuate the intent of the contracting parties and not to
interpret statutory rights. Id. at 53. The Court felt that, though arbitrators
might be well versed in the industrial law of the shop, there was no assurance
that they would be qualified to deal with public law. Id. at 56-57. The Court also
noted that arbitration procedures were informal and often lacking in due pro-
cess guarantees common to civil trials, such as "discovery, compulsory process,
cross-examination, and testimony under oath." Id. at 57-58.
46. Id. at 50. See Harper, Union Waiver of Employee Rights Under the NLRA (pt.
1), 4 INDUS. REL. L.J. 335, 347-54 (1981) (Congress did not intend that rights of
women or certain ethnic minorities to equitable employer treatment could be
sacrificed to collective improvement in conditions of employment). See also Bar-
rentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728 (1981). The Barrentine Court
rejected a claim that a federal court with jurisdiction to protect the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982), should simply accept the re-
sults of a contractual dispute resolution procedure. 450 U.S. at 745-46. The
Court stated that the individual employee's rights to a minimum wage and to
overtime pay were nonwaivable. Id. at 740. The Court concluded that protec-
tion of these rights by the judicial process could not be compromised by collec-
tive bargaining agreements. Id. at 745.
47. See NLRB v. Pincus Bros., Inc.-Maxwell, 620 F.2d 367, 384 (3d Cir.
1980) (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons suggested that the court was
establishing guidelines mandating Board deference, a position he described as
held by only one other court of appeals. Id. For a discussion of Pincus and the
Third Circuit's standards for Board review as compared with those of the other
courts of appeals, see supra notes 20, 40-43 and accompanying text. See also
Hammermill Paper Co. v. NLRB, 658 F.2d 155, 160 (3rd Cir. 1981) (deference
13
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structed the Board that it must defer to the outcome of arbitration as
long as four requirements are met. 49 Those requirements are that
(1) the arbitrator has decided the questions necessary to resolution of
the statutory inquiry; (2) the proceedings were fair; (3) the parties
agreed to be bound; and (4) the decision is not repugnant to the policies
of the NLRA. 50
The court's decision in Wolff& Munier appears to be consistent with
Pincus.5 1 The parties agreed to be bound by the arbitration process and
although a potential problem existed, the proceedings appeared to be
fair and regular.5 2 The court instructed the Board to determine, upon
remand, if the committee had considered the statutory issue of whether
the employees were supervisors as defined by the NLRA. 53 However,
under Pincus, if an arbitrator's decision is ambiguous but subject to a
permissible interpretation, the Board must choose that permissible in-
terpretation. 54 Therefore, if the Board on remand can plausibly find
that the arbitrator's decision that the employees were foremen is consis-
tent with a conclusion that the arbitrators determined that the employ-
to arbitration approved even though no evidence that arbitrator considered stat-
utory issue was provided), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1080 (1983).
48. 620 F.2d 367 (3d Cir. 1980). In Pincus, an employee was fired for hand-
ing out leaflets concerning various job-related grievances. Id. at 370-71. An
arbitrator found the employee was terminated for cause because she abused
working time. Id. at 375. The NLRB declined to defer to the arbitrator's deci-
sion and held that the leafletting was a protected activity under the NLRA. Id.
The Third Circuit reversed the Board and reinstated the arbitrator's decision.
Id. at 370.
49. Id. at 371. For a discussion of the circumstances in which the Board
need not defer, see supra notes 37-39.
50. 620 F.2d at 371-72. For a further discussion of NLRB deferral, see
supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
51. See 620 F.2d at 371-72. Pincus established that the Board must defer to
arbitration if certain requirements are met. Id. In Wolff & Munier, the court en-
forced this policy in two ways: It required the Board to defer or to explain, in
light of applicable standards, why it chose not to defer; and it made clear that
even questions of Board jurisdiction were deferrable to arbitration. 747 F.2d at
161. For further discussion of the requirements of deferral as outlined in Pincus,
see supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
52. Wolff& Munier, 747 F.2d at 159-60. The court noted, without decision,
that the arbitration committee's proceedings may have been lacking in equity
since the record indicated that both union and management had a common in-
terest in discharging the three men. Id. at 161 n.14. As pointed out by the
Third Circuit, the Board often refuses to defer when there is evidence of hostil-
ity by either the tribunal or the union representative toward the grievant. Id.
For a discussion of the Board's attitude toward proceedings lacking sufficient
due process guarantees, see supra note 20.
53. 747 F.2d at 161. The court stated that if the statutory issue had been
considered, the Board could only refuse to defer if one of its other standards
had not been met. Id. For a discussion of the statutory issue, see supra notes
14-19 and accompanying text.
54. 620 F.2d at 373. For a discussion of the permissible/impermissible test,
see supra note 20 and accompanying text.
1985] 1053
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ees were statutory "supervisors," the Board must choose that
permissible interpretation of the record. 55 Although an arbitration de-
cision that the foremen were not employees subject to NLRB jurisdic-
tion might be questionable, such an interpretation is nevertheless
plausible and therefore not clearly repugnant to the policies of the
Act. 56 Thus, the three men in Wolff & Munier may very well lose NLRA
protection because it is conceivable that the arbitrator decided that they
were supervisors 5 7 and it is plausible that such a decision is correct. 58
The Third Circuit's requirement that the Board choose a permissi-
ble interpretation, if possible, is somewhat at odds with the policies es-
poused by the Supreme Court. The Court has stated that the NLRB's
power to remedy unfair labor practices is superior to the arbitration pro-
cess.59 The Third Circuit, by allowing the Board to exercise its power
55. 620 F.2d at 373. See Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 574 (1984). In Olin,
the Board held that the requirement of deciding questions necessary to resolve
the statutory inquiry is met if the arbitrator is presented with the facts generally
relevant to resolving the issue. Id. Presumably, in Wolff & Munier, this require-
ment would be met as long as the arbitration committee considered whether the
employees' status as foremen was at all dispositive of their claim. For a discus-
sion of the men's arguable status as supervisors, see supra note 16. The Board
also requires that the contractual issue be factually consistent with the statutory
issue. Olin, 268 N.L.R.B. at 574. The two issues would seem to be consistent if
the employer's right to discharge the men without cause resulted from their un-
protected status as foremen, much the same way as supervisors who are not cov-
ered by the NLRA are unprotected. For a discussion of supervisors and NLRB
authority, see supra notes 16 & 19. It appears to be a plausible interpretation of
the arbitrator's vague opinion in Wolff & Munier that the employees were found
to be unprotected supervisors. See Wolff&Munier, 747 F.2d at 160. For a discus-
sion of the arbitration proceedings and the vagueness of the opinion, see supra
notes 13-14. Therefore, upon remand the Board appears to be required to find
that the men were supervisors within the meaning of the Act.
56. See Pincus, 620 F.2d at 371-72. For a discussion of "repugnancy to the
Act," see supra note 20.
57. For a discussion of the statutory meaning of supervisor, see supra note
7. As Professor Gorman has noted, in order to evaluate supervisory status, the
Board looks to see if an employee has authority to make judgmental personnel
decisions. R. GORMAN, supra note 16, at 36. Wolff& Munier foremen were spe-
cifically assigned the task of assigning and overseeing the work of other plumb-
ers. Wolff & Munier, 262 N.L.R.B. 333, 338 (1982). Whether this amounts to
authority to make judgmental personnel decisions is ambiguous and under
Pincus ambiguity is to be resolved in favor of the party urging deferral. 620 F.2d
at 371. For a discussion of courts with precisely the contrary approach, see supra
note 42. The Sixth Circuit has expressly required that all ambiguities be re-
solved against the party urging deferral. See NLRB v. Magnetics Int'l, Inc., 699
F.2d 806, 811 (6th Cir. 1983). For a discussion of the current Third Circuit
standard on whether the arbitrator has decided the statutory issue, see supra
note 22.
58. This would amount to a severe dilution of the employees § 7 rights.
For a discussion of such rights, see supra note 17. For a discussion of courts' and
commentators' concern that Board deference is often the equivalent of abdicat-
ing statutory authority, see supra notes 38-43.
59. See NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421,428 (1967) (Board has
superior power to remedy unfair labor practices); Carey v. Westinghouse Elec.
1054 [Vol. 30: p. 1040
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only when an arbitrator is clearly wrong or has clearly not considered
the relevant issue, 60 has sacrificed the Board's statutory mandate for the
sake of promoting the arbitration process.
6 1
Judge Sloviter's dissent argued that questions of NLRB jurisdiction
are not a proper area for deference no matter what criteria are met.
62
However, with limited exceptions, neither the Board nor the courts have
identified particular types of statutory problems as unsuitable for Board
deference.6 3 In Alexander, the Supreme Court held that since title VII
statutory rights are nonwaivable, alleged violations of those rights are
entitled to de novo review by the body statutorily empowered to protect
Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 272 (1964). In Carey, which involved a question of work-
place jurisdiction, the Court held that in case of a Board disagreement with the
arbitrator, the Board's ruling takes precedence. The Court noted that Board
deference to arbitration is a discretionary policy which advances industrial peace
but that the Board may nevertheless invoke its superior authority at any time.
Id. at 272. See also Liquor Salesmen's Union Local 2 v. NLRB, 664 F.2d 318, 326
(2d Cir. 1981) (deference must not be invoked arbitrarily), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
973 (1982). The Third Circuit's policy under Pincus of resolving all ambiguities
in favor of the party urging deference bears little similarity to a Board with un-
questioned supreme power to remedy unfair labor practices and which may in-
voke this power at any time. See C & C Plywood, 385 U.S. at 428.
60. See Pincus, 620 F.2d at 374. The Pincus court felt that the societal re-
wards of arbitration outweighed the need for a correct resolution of every case.
Id. The court claimed that this policy effectuated the intent of the parties to the
bargaining agreement, avoided duplicative proceedings, and served the goals of
achieving industrial peace and stability. Id. at 372, 374. For a discussion of the
Supreme Court's views on deference to arbitration as explained in the Steelwork-
ers trilogy, see supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
61. See NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421, 428 (1967) (Supreme
Court unequivocally held that Board's power to remedy unfair labor practices is
not outweighed by societal rewards of arbitration); Carey v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 375 U.S. 261, 272 (1964) (deference advances industrial peace because
Board can invoke superior authority at any time). The only situations in which
the Court has held that arbitration furthers industrial peace to such a degree
that it, rather than judicial proceedings, is the preferred method of dispute reso-
lution, are disputes which solely involve the interpretation of a collective bar-
gaining agreement. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). For a discussion of the Steelworkers cases, see
supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
62. 747 F.2d at 168 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). Judge Sloviter indicated that
Board deference is a matter of choice (though it must be applied evenhandedly)
and that the Board is under no obligation to defer questions of its own jurisdic-
tion. Id. For a discussion of Judge Sloviter's dissent, see supra notes 26-31 and
accompanying text.
63. These areas each concern protection of the integrity of Board
processes. See, e.g., Servair Inc., 236 N.L.R.B. 1278, 1281 (1978) (questions of
employer interference with union not deferrable); Filmation Assocs., 227
N.L.R.B. 1721, 1722 (1977) (employee discharge for giving testimony not def-
ferable); Commonwealth Gas Co., 218 N.L.R.B. 857, 858 (1975) (Board will not
defer on issues concerning representation). However, as Judge Sloviter pointed
out, perhaps the most important factor protecting Board processes is the thresh-
old determination of whether the Board has jurisdiction. 747 F.2d at 168
(Sloviter, J., dissenting).
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them.64 Similarly the Court has held that certain rights protected by the
NLRA cannot be waived. 6 5 It is submitted that charges alleging a viola-
tion of these rights should receive a complete, nondeferential review by
the Board. 66 In particular, questions of Board jurisdiction should be
protected by de novo review because the NLRA makes it clear that
Board jurisdiction cannot be waived or altered by private agreement.6 7
64. 415 U.S. at 42. For a discussion of Alexander and the Court's holding on
the protection of statutory rights, see supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
65. See NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1974). In Magnavox,
labor contracts between the International Union of Electrical, Radio and
Machine Workers (IUE) and Magnavox had routinely authorized the company to
issue plant rules controlling distribution of literature and employee nonworking
time. Id. at 323. When the employer's ban on these activities was challenged,
the Board struck down the rules as unlawful. The court of appeals disagreed,
reasoning that the contractual agreement constituted a waiver of the employees'
rights. Id. at 324. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the union had no
right to waive the solicitation and distribution rights of the employees. Id. at
325-26. Though unions may waive majoritarian rights such as the right to strike,
they may not waive an individual employee's statutory rights of free association
or self-organization. Id. For a discussion of the means used by the Board to
protect these rights, see supra note 17.
66. See General American Transp. Corp., 228 N.L.R.B. 808 (1977). In Gen-
eral American, the Board refused to defer to an arbitration procedure when an
employee claimed he was discharged because of his union activities. Id. at 819-
20. In a concurring opinion, NLRB Chairman Murphy concluded that Board
deferral is only proper when the dispute is between the contracting parties, such
as a refusal-to-bargain situation. Id. at 810. In cases alleging violation of an
employee's rights under § 7 of the NLRA, the Board would have no power to
defer. Id. at 810-11. This is because the key issue in such cases is not whether a
contractual right has been abridged but whether a statutory right has been vio-
lated. Id. at 812. Chairman Murphy pointed out that statutory rights cannot
lawfully be reduced by a contractual agreement between the employer and the
union. Id. at 813. This was the precise rationale used by the Supreme Court in
Alexander when it held that alleged violations of title VII are entitled to a trial on
the merits by a statutorily empowered body. 415 U.S. at 51. For a discussion of
Alexander, see supra notes 44-45.
67. National Labor Relations Act § 10(a), 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1982). See
supra note 33. In unfair labor practice cases, the Board is presented with a statu-
tory mandate:
If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of
the opinion that any person named in the complaint has engaged in or
is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall...
issue and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such
person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, and to take
such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or
without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this
[subchapter] ...
29 U.S.C. § 160(c).
The Board must decide whether to dismiss or issue the complaint upon a
preponderance of the evidence. Id. The policy favoring arbitration of contrac-
tual disputes may authorize the Board to give an arbitrator's findings of fact
deferential weight when it determines the preponderance of the evidence in a
case concerning a contractual issue. Labor Management Relations Act § 203(d),
29 U.S.C. § 173(d) (1982). For the applicable text, see supra note 32. However,
there appears to be no statutory support for deferring to an arbitrator on ques-
1056 [Vol. 30: p. 1040
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This would also be consistent with Supreme Court precedent, as the
only time the Court approved of NLRA deference was in relation to
waivable rights. 68
The policy underlying Board deference to arbitration is based on
the premise that the arbitrator will be an expert in the common law of
the shop. 69 Yet, the common law of the shop has little relevance to
questions of the Board's congressionally mandated jurisdiction. 70 It is
submitted that there is no reason why the Board should defer to an arbi-
trator in an area completely outside his expertise. 7 1
It is true that observers have distinguished title VII from the NLRA
because enactment of the former stemmed from concern with individual
rights7 2 while the NLRA was enacted to promote a general public policy
encouraging peace in the workplace. 73 It is therefore maintained that
tions of law. Board jurisdiction is undoubtedly such a question. See Wolff &
Munier, 747 F.2d at 168 (Sloviter,J., dissenting). Also, the Supreme Court has
rejected even deference to arbitral fact-finding when certain statutory, nonwaiv-
able rights are in question. See generally Alexander, 415 U.S. 36; Barrentine, 450
U.S. 728. For a discussion of Alexander, see supra notes 44-45 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of Barrentine, see supra note 46 and accompanying text.
68. See Carey, 375 U.S. at 270-72. See also Pincus, 620 F.2d at 387 (Gibbons,
J., dissenting) (unfair labor practice cases are not appropriate for Board deferral
but deference is proper in cases involving a dispute over workplace jurisdiction,
work assignment, or representation); General American, 228 N.L.R.B. at 810-11
(Murphy, M., concurring) (workplace jurisdiction is type of issue that concerns
contracting parties and is appropriate for Board deferral).
69. For a discussion of arbitration, industrial peace and the common law of
the shop, see supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
70. See Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 846, 850 (1971) (Fan-
ning, M., dissenting and Jenkins, M., dissenting). Member Fanning argued that
arbitrators are employed only to interpret the collective bargaining agreement.
Id. at 849 (Fanning, M., dissenting). He felt that they would generally try to
avoid an issue of public law because of their own recogni'tion that they had no
expertise in that area. Id. Member Jenkins claimed that arbitration does not
provide an adequate remedy for Act violations. Id. at 855 (Jenkins, M., dissent-
ing). The remedies available to an arbitrator are much more limited than those
at the disposal of the Board. See id. Also, arbitration can only be invoked by a
union and not by an individual. See id. Member Jenkins felt there was a danger
that unions and employers could contract themselves entirely out of the Act. Id.
It is submitted that this is a very real danger if arbitrators are to be given the
power to determine Board jurisdiction. See Wolff & Munier, 747 F.2d at 168
(Sloviter, J., dissenting) (Board must not defer to arbitrator's determination of
Board's own jurisdiction).
71. See General American, 228 N.L.R.B. at 813. In GeneralAmerican, Chairman
Murphy argued that an arbitrator is authorized only to consider whether an em-
ployee is engaged in contractually proscribed conduct and whether the contract
permits disciplinary action by the employer. Id. He noted that an arbitrator who
attempted to resolve whether § 7 rights had been violated would be overstep-
ping the power given him by the contract. Id. For a discussion of the Supreme
Court's view of arbitral competence, see supra note 35 and accompanying text.
72. See Harper, supra note 46, at 347. (Congress did not intend rights pro-
tected by title VII to be sacrificed to collective improvement in conditions of
employment).
73. See International Harvester, 138 N.L.R.B. 923, 925-26 (1962) (as re-
1985] 1057
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under the NLRA, the Board and the courts may promote broad public
policy even when doing so impinges on the individual rights of
employees.74
Even if this argument is accepted and de novo review is found un-
necessary, the standard of extreme deference exemplified by Wolff &
Munier should be curtailed. The result of the present policy of broad
deference is a severe dilution of employees' statutory rights. 75 It is sub-
mitted that this dilution is at odds with a policy promoting industrial
peace. Industrial relations are likely to become increasingly unstable as
employees recognize that they are receiving less statutory protection.
Moreover, a policy of extreme deference does not encourage utilization
of private arbitration procedures. As employees begin to realize that
use of private arbitration results in dilution of their statutory rights, they
will demand the exclusion of such procedures from collective bargaining
agreements. 76
Wolff & Munier illustrates the dangers inherent in promoting a pol-
icy of extreme deference. The three foremen stand to lose NLRA pro-
tection because they might have been supervisors, and because an
arbitrator with no known expertise in labor law might have decided the
statutory issue. 77 If the men were employees rather than supervisors as
defined by the NLRA, they will have lost the statutory protection Con-
gress intended they should have. 78 The Supreme Court, by providing
for de novo review, has safeguarded nonwaivable title VII rights from the
potential abuse that can arise from private arbitrators' lack of expertise
in dealing with statutory issues. 7 9 Since the Court has also identified
many of the rights protected by the NLRA as nonwaivable and statutory
questions involving unfair labor practices are similarly beyond an arbi-
trator's area of specialization, it is submitted that those rights should be
peatedly noted, NLRA is primarily designed to promote industrial peace and
stability).
74. See Pincus, 620 F.2d at 374. In Pincus, Judge Rosenn concluded that
"the national policy in favor of labor arbitration recognizes that the societal re-
wards of arbitration outweigh a need for uniformity of result or a correct resolu-
tion of the dispute in every case." Id. The court held that while title VII rights
are nonwaivable, the provisions of the NLRA are waivable collective bargaining
rights. Id. at 374 n.15.
75. For a discussion of Wolff & Munier and dilution of employee rights, see
supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
76. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 59 (suggesting employees might choose to by-
pass arbitration once they realize their rights are not being adequately
protected).
77. 747 F.2d at 160-61.
78. See NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 385 U.S. 421, 428 (1967) (Board
was given supreme power to remedy unfair labor practices).
79. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36 (1974). For a discussion
of Alexander, see supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
1058 [Vol. 30: p. 1040
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afforded equivalent protection.8 0 However, should the NLRB and the
courts conclude that de novo review is inappropriate, the present policy
of extreme deference should still be curtailed. Only then will workers
once again have the benefit of their congressionally mandated rights.
Jay Eisenhofer
80. For a discussion of arbitrator competence, see supra note 35 and accom-
panying text.
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